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The heart of the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988,
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
is given by the tracing procedure, a mathematicalconstruction that adjusts arbi-
trary prior beliefs into equilibrium beliefs. Although the term “procedure” suggests
a numericalapproach, the tracing procedure itsel f is a nonconstructive method. In
this paper we propose a homotopy algorithm that generates a path of strategies. By
using lexicographic pivoting techniques, it can be shown that for the entire class of
noncooperative N-person games, the path converges to an approximate Nash equi-
librium, even when the starting point or the game is degenerate. The outcome of the
algorithm is shown to be arbitrarily close to the equilibrium beliefs proposed by the
tracing procedure. Therefore, the algorithm does not compute just any Nash equi-
librium, but one with a sound game-theoretic underpinning. Like other homotopy
algorithms, it is easily implemented on a computer. Journalof Economic Literature
Classiﬁcation Numbers: C63, C72.  2002 Elsevier Science
Key Words: computation of equilibria; noncooperative game theory; tracing
procedure.
1. INTRODUCTION
In years past, economics has beneﬁted greatly from the introduction of
game-theoretic tools. A further use of game theory is hampered by at least
two factors, however. First, there may be many solutions to a game. This
view is expressed in van Damme (1999): “In the last two decades, game
theoretic methods have become more and more important in economics
and the other socialsciences. Many scientiﬁc papers in these areas have
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the following basic structure: A problem is modeled as a game, the game
is analyzed by computing its equilibria, and the properties of the latter
are translated back into insights relevant to the original problem   It has
been found that the tools may not be powerful enough   For example,
many models admit a vast multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes so that the
predictive power of game theoretic analysis is limited. To increase under-
standing, it may, hence, be necessary to perfect the tools.” A way out of
this dilemma has been suggested by the equilibrium selection theory as
described in Harsanyi and Selten (1988). The main ingredient of this equi-
librium selection theory is the linear tracing procedure. The linear tracing
procedure plays also an important role in making risk-dominance compar-
isons of Nash equilibria (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). The concept of
risk dominance is frequently used in evolutionary game theory.
A second problem is that it is usually far from obvious to derive any solu-
tion for a given game. Moreover, considering the remarks of van Damme
(1999), to ﬁnd just a solution is not good enough. What is really needed is
a solution that has a good game-theoretic underpinning—for instance, the
solution provided by the linear tracing procedure. In evolutionary game
theory, attention is often focused on two-player games where each player
has two strategies. An important reason to restrict oneself to these games is
that it is very hard to determine the risk-dominance relationships for Nash
equilibria in more complicated games. To do this, one needs to apply the
linear tracing procedure several times to these games, which generally is
not possible without a numerical algorithm.
This paper presents an algorithm that computates the Nash equilib-
rium selected by the linear tracing procedure for N-person noncooperative
games in normal form. The linear tracing procedure operates as follows.
The players start with identical initial beliefs concerning the play of the
other players, so that the beliefs concerning the play of a certain player
are equal among all players. First, the players optimize by playing best
replies against these initial beliefs. Next, they observe that their beliefs are
not met, and they subsequently update their beliefs and react optimally on
them. This updating of beliefs continues until equilibrium beliefs for the
game are found.
Mathematically, the linear tracing procedure can be modeled as tracing
a path of 0’s related to a homotopy. The homotopy transforms the initial
problem of playing against the prior beliefs into the equilibrium problem
of the game. It has been shown by Harsanyi (1975) that for a generic game,
the linear tracing procedure yields a path of points and selects a unique out-
come. In this case the linear tracing procedure is said to be well deﬁned.
For any game, the linear tracing procedure yields a set of strategies that
connects a best reply to the prior beliefs to at least one Nash equilibrium
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the exceptional case where multiple Nash equilibria are connected to the
prior beliefs, one possibility is to resort to the logarithmic tracing proce-
dure. Whenever the linear tracing procedure is well deﬁned, the logarithmic
tracing procedure will select the same outcome (see Schanuel et al., 1991).
The case with N = 2 players corresponds to the class of bimatrix games.
The ﬁrst algorithm for solving for a Nash equilibrium of these games has
been given by Lemke and Howson (1964). A drawback of this method is
that it must be started at a vertex of the strategy space. Implementational
details of a modiﬁed Lemke–Howson algorithm are discussed in Krohn
et al. (1991). More ﬂexible than the Lemke–Howson method is the one
proposed by van den Elzen and Talman (1991). This method can be started
from any strategy vector in the strategy space. In van den Elzen and Talman
(1999), it is shown that their algorithm generates a nonlinear transformation
of the path of beliefs corresponding to the path as generated by the linear
tracing procedure. This nonlinear transformation guarantees that the path
generated by the van den Elzen and Talman (1999) algorithm is piecewise
linear for bimatrix games, and thus is easily implemented on a computer.
This linear approach can also be extended to polymatrix games (see van
den Elzen, 1996), but not beyond.
The generalcase with N>2 is considerably more difﬁcult. For this case,
the Nash equilibrium equations are nonlinear and in general impossible to
solve analytically. Therefore, one must use a numerical approach. The ﬁrst
procedures for ﬁnding an equilibrium for N-person games were developed
by Rosenm¨ uller (1971) and Wilson (1971). Both methods can be seen as
different generalizations of the procedure of Lemke and Howson for two-
player games. Although these methods are not directly suitable for compu-
tational purposes, because they merely prove the existence of a nonlinear
path leading to an equilibrium, their seminal work was a very important step
toward an implementable algorithm as developed by Garcia et al. (1973). A
more efﬁcient algorithm was developed in van der Laan and Talman (1982)
that operates directly on the strategy space and that can be restarted at any
point in the strategy space. The problem with these algorithms is that they
just calculate an approximation of a sample Nash equilibrium and do not
address the game-theoretic properties of the equilibrium that is found.
In this paper we present a method that follows the set of strategies
implicitly deﬁned by the linear tracing procedure arbitrarily close. In this
way we make the linear tracing procedure operational for N-player games.
The entire path of strategy vectors generated has a game-theoretic inter-
pretation (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Unlike the algorithm for the
two-player case of van den Elzen and Talman (1999), our algorithm works
directly on the same strategy space and with the same payoff function as
used in the linear tracing procedure. The entire space is given by  0 1 ×S,
with  0 1  the intervalfrom which the homotopy parameter, t, is chosen and92 herings and van den elzen
S the Cartesian product of the N individualstrategy sets. By triangul ating
the set  0 1 ×S, we replace the original problem by a piecewise linear
one. The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy algorithms ﬁrst devel-
oped in Eaves (1972). The algorithm is constructed in such a way that any
triangulation can be used. Of course, in practice one would like to take a
triangulation that can be implemented easily on a computer.
A novelty of the algorithm is that the starting point is endogenously
determined by the game’s payoffs. We show that the algorithm selects in
every game a unique vertex of the strategy space that is related to Nash
equilibrium play against the prior. (This latter property may be satisﬁed for
many vertices.) The starting point is chosen such that the algorithm will
not generate any other simplices in  0 ×S. We prove that we can approx-
imate the entire path of a well-deﬁned linear tracing procedure arbitrarily
close by taking simplices with small enough mesh size. If the linear tracing
procedure is not well deﬁned, then we will still stay arbitrarily close to the
set of strategies generated by it, and will compute an approximation of a
Nash equilibrium in this set. These features are also new, since unlike for
other simplicial algorithms, here we have to consider the convergence of
a sequence of paths and not only the convergence of a sequence of end-
points. Otherwise we cannot guarantee that the Nash equilibrium selected
by the linear tracing procedure is also selected by the algorithm. These
problems do not occur for the two-player case, since in that case it is possi-
ble to generate the path of the linear tracing procedure exactly. To handle
degeneracies, we use lexicographic pivoting techniques. Degeneracies are
important in game theory and are often the rule rather than the exception.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some notation and
the deﬁnition of the linear tracing procedure. In Section 3 we treat some
preliminaries for piecewise linear methods, and in Section 4 we explain
the algorithm, which is illustrated in Section 5 by means of an example.
In Section 6 we prove the convergence of the algorithm for any game.
This implies that for every game, we can compute an approximate Nash
equilibrium. In Section 7 we show that if the mesh size of the triangulation
used goes to 0, then the paths generated by the algorithm converge to the
path of the linear tracing procedure and the approximate Nash equilibria
converge to the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure.
2. THE LINEAR TRACING PROCEDURE
For m ∈ ,le t m
+ be the nonnegative orthant of the m-dimensional
Euclidean space and let Sm denote the  m − 1 -dimensionalunit sim-
plex in m, i.e. Sm =  x ∈ m
+  
 m
j=1 xj = 1 .F o rj = 1     m,w e
denote by em j  the jth m-dimensionalunit vector. Furthermore, 0 m andcomputation and selection of nash equilibria 93
1m denote the m-dimensionalvectors of al l0’s and al l1’s, respectivel y.
The m-dimensionalunit matrix is denoted by Im. The notation “co” is used
to denote the convex hull of a set.
An N-person noncooperative game in normalform is a tupl e   =
  1       N R 1     R N , with  i and Ri  
 
i∈  i →  is the set of pure
strategies and the payoff function of player i, and  =  1     N  the set
of players. Player i has Mi pure strategies. The totalnumber of pure strate-
gies is given by M =
 
i∈ Mi. We number the pure strategies of player i.
For k = 1     M i, pure strategy k of player i is denoted by  i k . The
union of the pure strategies over all players is denoted by  ∗ =∪ i∈ i.
The set of pure strategy combinations is given by   =
 
i∈  i.
A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution on  i. Since the
strategies are numbered, we can identify the set of all probability distribu-
tions on  i with SMi, where for si ∈ SMi the probability assigned to pure
strategy  i k  is given by sik. With a slight abuse of notation, we also denote
by  i k  the mixed strategy si that assigns weight 1 to pure strategy  i k ,
when no confusion is possible. The strategy space of the game is equal to
S =
 
i∈ SMi. Observe that the dimension of S equals M − N. Given a
mixed strategy combination s ∈ S and a strategy ¯ si ∈ SMi, we denote by
s\¯ si the mixed strategy combination that results from replacing si by ¯ si.I fa
mixed strategy combination s is played, then the probability s φ  that the









s φ Ri φ  
A mixed strategy combination s is said to be a Nash equilibrium of a game
  if it is a best reply against itself. The set of Nash equilibria of a game  
is denoted by NE( ).
For the remainder of the paper, an N-person noncooperative game   is
assumed to be given. In the description of the linear tracing procedure, a
subjective probability distribution p ∈ S, called the prior, is given. The prior
describes the initial beliefs of all players about the strategies played by the
other players. So it is assumed that all players have the same initial beliefs.
The determination of the prior is one of the aspects of the equilibrium
selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Throughout the remainder
of the paper, a prior p is assumed to be given.
For every t ∈  0 1 , the linear tracing procedure generates a Nash equi-
librium of a game  t =   1       N R t
1     R t
N , where the payoff func-
tion Rt
i     →  of player i is deﬁned by
Rt
i φ =tRi φ +  1 − t Ri p\φi  94 herings and van den elzen
Together, all of the Nash equilibria generated by the linear tracing proce-
dure yields a set of strategies (usually a path of strategies) linking a Nash
equilibrium of  0 to a Nash equilibrium of  1. In a Nash equilibrium st of
the game  t, every player i plays a best reply in the game   against the prob-
ability distribution t s +  1 − t  p  on  , with  s  and  p  the probability
distributions on   generated by s and p, respectively. The probability distri-
bution t s + 1−t  p  generally does not belong to S, since this probability
distribution may be correlated. The interpretation of the linear tracing pro-
cedure is that players gradually adjust their beliefs about the behavior of
the other players, giving less and less weight to the initial beliefs, the prior.
In the game  0, for instance, there is no strategic interaction, and players
simply choose a best reply to the prior. In the game  1, there is no longer
a role for the prior, and players choose a best reply against the choices of
their opponents. (For more details on the tracing procedure, see Harsanyi
and Selten, 1988.)
The marginalpayoff function G    0 1 ×S → M is deﬁned by
Gik t s =tRi s\ i k   +  1 − t Ri p\ i k     i k ∈ ∗  (1)
Gik t s  is the payoff to player i when playing pure strategy  i k  against
the mixed strategy combination s in game  t or, alternatively, the pay-
off to player i when playing pure strategy  i k  against the probability
distribution t s +  1 − t  p  on   in the game  . It is standard to char-
acterize a Nash equilibrium of the game  t in terms of G t · . Indeed,
s is a Nash equilibrium of  t if and only if for all  i k ∈ ∗, sik > 0
implies Gik t s =max i l ∈ i Gil t s . Therefore, it makes sense to deﬁne
for   ≥ 0a n -Nash equilibrium of  t as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let    p  be given. For   ≥ 0, a mixed strategy com-
bination s ∈ S is called an  -Nash equilibrium of  t if sik > 0 implies
Gik t s ≥max i l ∈ i Gil t s − .
A player can increase his payoff in an  -Nash equilibrium of  t at most
by   by choosing a best reply. The set of all Nash equilibria related to the
games  t, t ∈  0 1 , is denoted by
 =    t s ∈  0 1 ×S   s ∈ NE  t   
The linear tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path in
 connecting a best reply against the prior to a Nash equilibrium of the
game  ; i.e., there exists a continuous function γ    0 1 → such that
γ 0 ∈ ∩    0 ×S  and γ 1 ∈ ∩    1 ×S . It is shown in Schanuel
et al. (1991) that the linear tracing procedure is always feasible. However,
there may be many trajectories γ  0 1   that link a Nash equilibrium of
 0 to a Nash equilibrium of  1. If this trajectory is unique, then the linearcomputation and selection of nash equilibria 95
tracing procedure is said to be well deﬁned. If the linear tracing procedure
is well deﬁned, then it selects a unique Nash equilibrium of the game  .I ti s
shown by Harsanyi (1975) that, given a prior, the linear tracing procedure
is well deﬁned for almost all N-person noncooperative games.
It is obvious that the set 0 =  ∩  0 ×S  is connected. In fact, because
of the linearity of G 0 · , it holds that 0 is a polytope, the set of best
replies against p. We denote the component (i.e., a maximally connected
subset) of  that contains 0 by c. Since  is a semialgebraic set (see
Schanuel et al., 1991), it holds that c is pathconnected. The linear tracing
procedure is feasible if and only if c ∩    1 ×S   =  . An implication
of the well deﬁnedness of the linear tracing procedure is that both c ∩
  0 ×S  and c ∩    1 ×S  consist of a single element.
If the number of players is equal to two, then it is possible to compute the
set c exactly. However, even in that case there is a need for a systematic
approach as given in van den Elzen and Talman (1999). If the number
of players is greater than or equal to three, then computing the set c
corresponds to solving a higher-order polynomial, which cannot be done in
general. In that case there is a need not only for a systematic approach, but
also for a numerical algorithm.
3. A PIECEWISE LINEAR APPROACH
The basic idea for the algorithm is relatively simple. We approximate the
marginalpayoff function G as given in Eq. (1) by a function that is piece-
wise linear on  0 1 ×S. Then we can solve for the set c corresponding
to this piecewise linear approximation.
Let us discuss some preliminaries related to piecewise linear approx-
imations. For given m ∈ ,a nm-dimensionalsimpl ex or m-simplex
σ in n is deﬁned as the convex hull of m + 1 afﬁnely independent
points x1     x m+1 of n. We usually write σ = σ x1     x m+1  and call
x1     x m+1 the vertices of σ.A n m − 1 -simplex that is, the convex hull
of m vertices of σ x1     x m+1 , is said to be a facet of σ. The facet
τ x1     x j−1 x j+1     x m+1  is called the facet of σ opposite to the ver-
tex xj. For a nonnegative integer m  less than or equal to m,a nm -simplex
that is the convex hull of m  + 1 vertices of σ is said to be an m -face or
face of σ.
A ﬁnite collection   of m-simplices is a triangulation of an m-dimensional
convex subset T of n if (1) T is the union of all simplices in   and (2) the
intersection of any two simplices in   is either empty or a common face
of both. If   is a triangulation of T, and a facet τ of σ1 ∈   is a subset
of the relative boundary of T, then there is no σ2 ∈   such that σ2  = σ1
and τ is a facet of σ2.I fτ is not a subset of the relative boundary of T,96herings and van den elzen
FIG. 1. A triangulation of  0 1 ×S. The vertex ¯ x1 =  0  1 0   1 0   refers to the strategy
vector at which both players play their ﬁrst pure strategy. Similarly, ¯ x3  ¯ x7, and ¯ X9 correspond
to  0  0 1   1 0  ,  0  1 0   0 1  , and  0  0 1   0 1  , respectively.
then there is exactly one σ2 ∈   such that σ2  = σ1 and τ is also a facet
of σ2. The mesh size of a triangulation   of T is deﬁned by mesh   =
max  x − y ∞   x  y ∈ σ σ ∈   .
It is well known that full-dimensional afﬁne parts of the relative boundary
of a set are triangulated by the facets of the simplices in a triangulation.
More precisely, let   be a triangulation of a convex m-dimensionalsubset
T of n, and let the  m − 1 -dimensionalsubset   T of the relative boundary
of T be such that   T is equalto the afﬁne hul lof   T intersected with T.
Then the collection     given by     =  τ ∈   T  ∃ σ ∈  , τ is a facet of σ  is a
triangulation of   T (see Todd, 1976a), Theorem 2.3, p. 27). For instance, the
set  0 ×S is triangulated by some facets of the simplices in a triangulation
of  0 1 ×S.
An example of a triangulation of  0 1 ×S has been introduced in Doup
and Talman (1987) and uses earlier ideas of Eaves and Saigal (1972), Todd
(1976b), and van der Laan and Talman (1980). It is illustrated in Figure 1
for the case where we have two players, each having two pure strategies.
Although any triangulation of  0 1 ×S will do for the purposes of the
algorithm, this triangulation has several nice properties. First, it is easily
implemented on a computer. Moreover, it has several nice symmetry prop-
erties. For example, it enables us to choose points t0     tk with t0 = 0
and tk = 1 (a naturalchoice woul d be tj = j/k, j = 0     k) such that
every slice  tj ×S is triangulated in an identical way by the facets of the









k ×S is ﬁlled up with simplices in a
consistent way. All 3-simplices in co ¯ x3  ¯ x5  ¯ x6  ¯ x12  ¯ x14  ¯ x15  are depicted in
Figure 1. The mesh size of this triangulation can be made arbitrarily small.computation and selection of nash equilibria 97
TABLE I
All Full-Dimensional Simplices in  0 
1
2 ×S
co  ¯ x4  ¯ x7  ¯ x5  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x8  ¯ x7  ¯ x5  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x8  ¯ x9  ¯ x5  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x6  ¯ x9  ¯ x5  ¯ x14  
co  ¯ x4  ¯ x7  ¯ x16  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x8  ¯ x7  ¯ x16  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x8  ¯ x9  ¯ x18  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x6  ¯ x9  ¯ x18  ¯ x14  
co  ¯ x4  ¯ x13  ¯ x16  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x8  ¯ x17  ¯ x16  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x8  ¯ x17  ¯ x18  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x6  ¯ x15  ¯ x18  ¯ x14  
co  ¯ x4  ¯ x1  ¯ x5  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x2  ¯ x1  ¯ x5  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x2  ¯ x3  ¯ x5  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x6  ¯ x3  ¯ x5  ¯ x14  
co  ¯ x4  ¯ x1  ¯ x10  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x2  ¯ x1  ¯ x10  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x2  ¯ x3  ¯ x12  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x6  ¯ x3  ¯ x12  ¯ x14  
co  ¯ x4  ¯ x13  ¯ x10  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x2  ¯ x11  ¯ x10  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x2  ¯ x11  ¯ x12  ¯ x14   co  ¯ x6  ¯ x15  ¯ x12  ¯ x14  
For later use, we give all 3-simplices in the triangulation of Figure 1 in
Table I. In the table only the 3-simplices in  0  1
2 ×S are given, the ones
in  1
2 1 ×S follow by means of a translation. The position in the table is
related to the position of a simplex in the triangulation.
A function   G    0 1 ×S → M is called a piecewise linear approxima-
tion of the marginalpayoff function G with respect to   if for each vertex xj
of any σ x1     x M−N+2 ∈ ,   G xj =G xj  and   G is afﬁne on each sim-
plex of  . Hence, if x ∈ σ x1     x M−N+2 , so that x =
 M−N+2
j=1 λjxj, λj ≥
0, j = 1     M− N + 2,
 M−N+2
j=1 λj = 1, then   G x =
 M−N+2
j=1 λj   G xj .
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let    p    be given. A mixed strategy combination
s ∈ S is called an approximate Nash equilibrium of  t if sik > 0 implies
  Gik t s =max i l ∈ i
  Gil t s .
The algorithm will yield a path of approximate Nash equilibria going from
an approximate Nash equilibrium of  0 to an approximate Nash equilibrium
of  1. An approximate Nash equilibrium of  t is not necessarily a Nash
equilibrium of  t (although it is possible to show that an approximate Nash
equilibrium of  0 is a Nash equilibrium of  0 . Nevertheless, the following
result shows that it is an  -Nash equilibrium of  t, with  >0 related to
the mesh size of the triangulation.
Theorem 3.2. Let    p    be given. For every  >0, we can choose
δ>0 such that ˆ x  ˜ x ∈  0 1 ×S,  ˆ x −˜ x ∞ ≤ δ, implies  G ˆ x −G ˜ x  ∞ ≤
1
2 . If the mesh size of   is less than δ and ¯ s is an approximate Nash equilib-
rium of  
¯ t, then ¯ s is an  -Nash equilibrium of  
¯ t.
Proof. Let  >0 be given. Since G is a continuous function with domain
a compact set, we can choose δ>0 as in the theorem. Let the mesh size of
  be less than δ and let ¯ s be an approximate Nash equilibrium of  
¯ t.L e t
σ ∈   be such that ¯ x =  ¯ t ¯ s ∈σ. Then there exists λ ∈ M−N+2 such that  M−N+2
j=1 λj = 1 and ¯ x =
 M−N+2
j=1 λjxj, with xj the vertices of σ. Then
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and so, for every  i k ∈ ∗,
  Gik ¯ x −
1
2




Now, ¯ sik > 0 implies
Gik ¯ t ¯ s =Gik ¯ x ≥  Gik ¯ x −
1
2
  = max
 i  l ∈ i





 i  l ∈ i
Gil ¯ x − 
= max
 i  l ∈ i
Gil ¯ t ¯ s −  
By Theorem 3.2, we can show that the algorithm generates a path of
 -Nash equilibria of games  t, t ∈  0 1 , with   going to 0 if the mesh size
δ of the triangulation   goes to 0. The result makes clear that it is possible
to give an upper bound for δ in terms of  , the payoffs of the game, Ri,
and the prior p.
4. THE ALGORITHM
Let a subset B∗ of  ∗ be given with the property that for every player i
there is at least one pure strategy  i k  in B∗. Such a set B∗ is called
admissible. Let Bi denote the set of all pure strategies of player i in B∗.
The set Bi is related to all best replies of player i against a certain strategy
combination. The set S B∗  denotes all mixed strategy combinations that









 i  k ∈Bi
sik = 1 i∈ 
 
 
Let a triangulation   of  0 1 ×S be given. For an admissible subset
B∗ of  ∗, we denote by   B∗  the collection of m-faces of simplices in  ,
where m =  B∗ +1 − N, that are contained in  0 1 ×S B∗ ,s o
  B∗ = τ⊂ 0 1 ×S B∗  ∃σ∈   τ is a   B∗ +1−N -face of σ  
Here  B∗  denotes the cardinality of B∗. By repeated application of the
result claiming that the relative boundary of a set is triangulated by the
facets of a triangulation, it follows that   B∗  is a triangulation of  0 1 ×
S B∗ . Notice that    ∗ = .
Let an admissible B∗ ⊂  ∗ and a simplex σ x1     x m+1 ∈  B∗  be
given. Consider solutions ξ =    λj j=1     m+1  µik  i  k ∈ ∗\B∗  βi i∈ ∈
M+2 of the following system of equations:
 m+1
j=1 λj = 1 
 m+1
j=1 λj   Gi xj +
 
 i  k ∈ i\Bi µikeMi k −βi1Mi = 0Mi i ∈  
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If λj ≥ 0, j = 1     m+ 1, and µik ≥ 0,  i k ∈ i\Bi, then ξ is called an
admissible solution to Eq. (2). An admissible solution ξ corresponds to an
approximate Nash equilibrium s of  t. Indeed,  t s =
 m+1
j=1 λjxj, strategies
in B∗ are best replies given the marginal payoff function   G, µik is the payoff
gap between strategy  i k ∈ i\Bi and a best reply for player i, and βi is
the payoff for player i according to the marginalpayoff function   G when
he uses a best reply. Since σ ⊂  0 1 ×S B∗ , strategies that are not a best
reply are played with probability zero. An admissible solution to Eq. (2) is
said to be degenerate if at least two of the variables λj, j = 1     m+ 1,
and µik,  i k ∈ ∗\B∗ are equalto 0.
Later in this section, we introduce an algorithm that generates by means
of lexicographic pivoting techniques a piecewise linear path of approxi-
mate Nash equilibria in  0 1 ×S joining  0 ×S to  1 ×S. The path is
such that every  t s  on it corresponds to an admissible B∗ ⊂  ∗, a simplex
σ ∈   B∗ , and an admissible solution ξ as described earlier. The algorithm
speciﬁes in a unique way how to move from one simplex to another. For
given  B∗ σ , Eq. (2) corresponds to a linear system with M + 1 equations
and M +2 variables. If we rule out degeneracies, then a nonempty solution
set is a one-dimensional compact line segment. The endpoints of the line
segment are either approximate Nash equilibria for  0 or  1, or yield solu-
tions for a new    B∗  ¯ σ . Indeed, with degeneracies ruled out, at an endpoint
either λj = 0 for exactly one j or µik = 0 for exactly one  i k ∈ i\Bi.
In the ﬁrst case, the endpoint belongs to the facet τ of σ opposite to the
vertex xj.I fτ belongs to the relative interior of  0 1 ×S B∗ , then there
is a unique simplex ¯ σ ∈   B∗  such that ¯ σ  = σ, and τ is a facet of ¯ σ.
The algorithm continues by generating a line segment of solutions in ¯ σ.I f
τ belongs to the relative boundary of  0 1 ×S B∗ , then the endpoint is
either an approximate Nash equilibrium for  0, an approximate Nash equi-
librium for  1,o rτ ∈     B∗ , with   B∗ a uniquely determined subset of B∗
with one less element, and the algorithm continues with a line segment
of solutions in τ.I fµik = 0, then strategy  i k  is also a best reply. The
algorithm continues with a line segment of solutions in ¯ σ, where ¯ σ is the
unique simplex in   B∗ ∪    i k    with σ as a facet.
In game theory, degeneracy is not always a nongeneric phenomenon. For
instance, for a normal-form representation of a game in extensive form,
degeneracy is the rule rather than the exception, even if the payoffs in
the extensive-form game are randomly chosen. But degeneracy also can
easily occur in other normal-form games, representing certain economic
situations, simply because payoffs are not randomly chosen but reﬂect some
structure that is present in the economic model. We deal with degeneracy
by exploiting lexicographic pivoting techniques. In this paper we extend the
techniques used in Eaves (1971), Todd (1976a), Wright (1981), and Herings
et al. (1996).100 herings and van den elzen
Let us take a closer look at the system Eq. (2). For an admissible B∗ ⊂  ∗
and a facet τ x1     x m  of a simplex in   B∗ , the  M + 1 ×  M + 1 








1 ··· 10 ··· ··· ··· ··· 0
E1 0 −1M1 0
  G x1  ···   G xm  0
    00
    0








where, for i ∈ , Ei =  eMi k   i  k ∈ i\Bi. The matrix AB∗ τ corresponds
to the coefﬁcients in Eq. (2) when a facet τ of a simplex σ is considered.
Suppose that A
−1
B∗ τ exists. From AB∗ τA
−1
B∗ τ = IM+1, it follows that the ﬁrst
column of A
−1
B∗ τ corresponds to an admissible solution to Eq. (2) for any
σ ∈   B∗  being the convex hull of τ and some vertex xm+1 ∈  0 1 ×S B∗ ,
whenever the ﬁrst M + 1 − N components of this column are nonnegative.
No restrictions are imposed on the last N rows of A
−1
B∗ τ. In a nondegenerate
solution, the ﬁrst M + 1 − N components are all positive, since λm+1 = 0
extends the solution for the facet τ to the simplex σ.
A row vector x ∈ M+1 is lexicographically positive if x  = 0M+1 
and
its ﬁrst nonzero entry is positive. The matrix A
−1
B∗ τ is said to be semi-
lexicopositive if each of the ﬁrst M + 1 − N rows is lexicographically posi-
tive.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let    p    be given and let B∗ be an admissible sub-




By restricting attention to complete facets, we can take care of degen-
eracy problems. Given a linear system of equations as in Eq. (2), deter-
mined by a B∗-complete facet τ, we pivot in a uniquely determined new
column of either the type  1    G xm+1   or the type  0 e M k  . Generi-
cally, such a pivot step determines in a unique way a column out of the
ﬁrst M + 1 − N to be replaced. In degenerate cases, the leaving column
may not be uniquely determined. A semi-lexicographic pivot step is a pivot
step where the leaving column is selected in such a way that the inverse
of the resulting matrix AB∗ τ is semi-lexicopositive. We show that a semi-
lexicographic pivot step determines in a unique way in all cases which col-
umn out of the ﬁrst M + 1 − N is to be replaced.
To make the notion of a semi-lexicographic pivot step more precise, we
need the concept of a lexicographic ordering. A vector ¯ x ∈ n is said
to be lexicographically greater than a vector x ∈ n if ¯ x − x is lexico-
graphically positive. In this way, the lexicographic ordering is obtained as
a complete ordering on n. Consider a B∗-complete facet τ and a columncomputation and selection of nash equilibria 101
z ∈ M+1 that has to be pivoted in the system determined by the matrix
AB∗ τ. In all cases that we consider, z is of either the type  1    G xm+1  
or the type  0 e M k  . Deﬁne y ∈ M+1 as y = A
−1
B∗ τz. We show in
Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 that yj > 0 for some j ∈  1     M+ 1 − N .L e t
j  ∈  1     M+ 1 − N  be such that 1
yj   A
−1
B∗ τ j · is minimalaccording to
the lexicographic ordering over all row vectors 1
yj A
−1
B∗ τ j· for which yj > 0
and j ∈  1     M+ 1 − N . We show in Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 that j  is
uniquely determined. The operation of replacing column j  of AB∗ τ by z
is a semi-lexicographic pivot step. A semi-lexicographic pivot step is not
more difﬁcult to carry out than a normal pivot step and coincides with it in
nondegenerate cases.
The following lemma is well known in linear programming theory (see,
e.g., Murty, 1983). It can be used to link several complete facets to each
other.
Lemma 4.2. Let an invertible n × n matrix A, a vector z of n,
and some j ∈  1     n  be given. The n × n matrix   A is deﬁned by
  A =  A·1    A ·j−1 zA ·j+1    A ·n . Then either  A−1z j = 0 and   A is
singular, or  A−1z j  = 0 and


















 A−1 1· −
 A−1z 1
 A−1z j  A−1 j·
     
 A−1 j−1· −
 A−1z j−1
 A−1z j  A−1 j·
1
 A−1z j A−1 j·
 A−1 j+1· −
 A−1z j+1
 A−1z j  A−1 j·
     
 A−1 n· −
 A−1z n



















Lemma 4.2 is easily shown by calculating   A−1   A.
Lemma 4.3 describes all possible cases that may occur if a B∗-complete
facet τ is given and a semi-lexicographic pivot step with a vector
 1    G xm+1   is made, where xm+1 is a vertex of a simplex having τ
as a facet opposite to it. The structure of the proof of Lemma 4.3 (as well
as Lemma 4.4) is closely related to the one of Wright (1981) and Herings
et al. (1996), although, of course, we have to deal with the speciﬁcs of our
algorithm.102 herings and van den elzen
Lemma 4.3. Let    p    be given. Consider a B∗-complete facet τ of a
simplex σ ∈   B∗ . Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. σ has exactly one other B∗-complete facet ¯ τ.
2. σ is   B∗ complete for precisely one admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗.







  G xm+1 
 
 
Since  AB∗ τ 1· =  1m 
 0M+1−m 








B∗ τ jl = 0, l = 2     M+ 1. Suppose that the ﬁrst M + 1 − N


















1 0M   
1
  G xm+1 
 
= 1 
where the ﬁrst inequality uses that m ≤ M + 1 − N. Consequently, yj > 0
for some j ∈  1     M+ 1 − N .L e tj  ∈  1     M+ 1 − N  be the
column in AB∗ τ pivoted out by a semi-lexicographic pivot step, so j  is such
that 1
yj   A
−1




B∗ τ j· for which yj > 0 and j ∈  1     M+ 1 − N . The
row j  is uniquely determined, because otherwise there would be two rows
that are linearly dependent, and A
−1
B∗ τ would not be invertible. It holds that
either j  ∈  1     m  or j  ∈  m + 1     M+ 1 − N .
In the ﬁrst case, let ¯ τ be the facet of σ opposite xj 
. By Lemma 4.2 and
the choice of j , it follows that A
−1
B∗  ¯ τ exists and is semi-lexicopositive. So ¯ τ
is B∗ complete.
In the second case, it holds that column j  of AB∗ τ corresponds to pure
strategy k of player i.L e t  B∗ ⊂  ∗ be deﬁned by   B∗ = B∗ ∪    i k  . Obvi-
ously,   B∗ is admissible, and σ is a facet of a simplex of     B∗ . By Lemma 4.2
and the choice of j , it follows that A
−1
  B∗ σ exists and is semi-lexicopositive.
So σ is   B∗ complete.
Lemma 4.2 guarantees that replacement of another column of AB∗ τ
would give a new matrix that does not have a semi-lexicopositive inverse.
This implies that the two cases considered here are mutually exclusive, and
that the facet ¯ τ and the set   B∗ are uniquely determined.
Consider a B∗-complete facet τ that is also a simplex belonging to     B∗ 
for some admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗. Then there is a unique strategy  ¯ i  ¯ k  suchcomputation and selection of nash equilibria 103
that B∗ =   B∗ ∪   ¯ i  ¯ k  . Lemma 4.4 describes all possible cases that may
occur if a semi-lexicographic pivot step with a vector  0 e M l   is made,
where l =
 ¯ i−1
i=1 Mi + ¯ k.
Lemma 4.4. Let    p    be given. Consider a B∗-complete facet τ that
belongs to     B∗  for some admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗. Then exactly one of the fol-
lowing cases holds:
1. τ is   B∗ complete for precisely one admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗ with   B∗  = B∗.
2. Precisely one facet υ of τ is   B∗ complete.
Proof. There is a unique strategy  ¯ i  ¯ k  such that B∗ =   B∗ ∪    ¯ i  ¯ k  .
Deﬁne l =
 ¯ i−1









Since  AB∗ τ 1· =  1m 
 0M+1−m 








B∗ τ jl = 0, l = 2     M+ 1. Suppose that the ﬁrst M + 1 − N
components of y are nonpositive. Then
 
1m 























 AB∗ τ l+1 jyj =
M+1  
j=m+1
 AB∗ τ l+1 jyj =− yM+1−N+¯ i 





can exist only if
 ¯ i k  / ∈ B¯ i for every k  = ¯ k. Since B∗ =   B∗ ∪  ¯ i  ¯ k  , it follows that   B∗ is not
admissible, a contradiction. Consequently, yj > 0 for some j ∈  1     M+
1 − N .L e tj  ∈  1     M+ 1 − N  be the column in AB∗ τ pivoted out
by a semi-lexicographic pivot step, so j  is such that 1
yj   A
−1
B∗ τ j · is minimal
according to the lexicographic ordering over all row vectors 1
yj A
−1
B∗ τ j· for
which yj > 0 and j ∈  1     M+ 1 − N . The row j  must be unique,
because otherwise A
−1
B∗ τ would not be invertible. It holds that either j  ∈
 1     m  or j  ∈  m + 1     M+ 1 − N .
If j  ∈  m + 1     M+ 1 − N , then let  i  k    be the strategy that
corresponds to column j . Let an admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗ be deﬁned by104 herings and van den elzen
  B∗ =   B∗ ∪    i  k    , and consider A  B∗ τ. By Lemma 4.2, the choice of j 
guarantees that A
−1
  B∗ τ is semi-lexicopositive, and thus τ is   B∗ complete.
If j  ∈  1     m , then let υ be the facet of τ opposite xj 
. Using
Lemma 4.2, the choice of j  implies that A
−1
  B∗ υ is semi-lexicopositive and
hence υ is   B∗ complete.
Again, Lemma 4.2 guarantees that replacing another column of AB∗ τ
would give a new matrix that does not have a semi-lexicopositive inverse.
This implies that the two cases considered here are mutually exclusive, and
that the facet υ and the set   B∗ are uniquely determined.
The consideration of B∗-complete facets will also provide us with a
unique, endogenously determined starting point for the algorithm. The
admissible subset B0
∗ of  ∗ is deﬁned by B0
i =    i ki  , i ∈ , where ki is
the largest integer such that  i ki  is a best reply to p for player i. Notice
that  B0
∗ =N. The facet (vertex) τ =  0 ×S B0
∗  is B0
∗ complete, (see
Lemma 6.1 for a proof). It will be shown that there is no other B∗-complete
facet τ in  0 ×S. Even in degenerate cases, the semi-lexicographic rules
single out the unique B0
∗-complete facet  0 ×S B0
∗ , which will serve as a
unique, endogenously determined starting point of the algorithm.
The steps of the algorithm are as follows.
Algorithm 4.5. Let    p    be given.
Step 0. Let m = 1 and n = 1. Let B∗ = B0
∗, τ1 =  0 ×S B∗ , and x2
be the unique vertex of the 1-simplex of   B∗  containing τ1 as the facet
opposite to it.
Step 1. Let σ be equalto the convex hul lof τn and  xm+1 . Make a
semi-lexicographic pivot step with  1    G xm+1   into the system of equations
Eq. (2) corresponding to AB∗ τn, yielding a unique column j  of AB∗ τn
which has to be replaced. If j  ∈  m+1     M+1−N , then go to step 3
with  i  k    the pure strategy corresponding to column j . Otherwise, go to
step 2.
Step 2. Increase the value of n by 1, and let τn be the facet of σ oppo-
site xj 
.I fτn ⊂  1 ×S, then the algorithm terminates with an approximate
Nash equilibrium s∗ of  1 induced by the solution of Eq. (2) corresponding
to AB∗ τn.I fτn ∈     B∗  for some admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗, then go to step 4.
Otherwise, there is exactly one m-simplex ¯ σ of   B∗  such that ¯ σ  = σ
and τn is a facet of ¯ σ. Go to step 1 with xm+1 as the unique vertex of ¯ σ
opposite τn.
Step 3. Let the admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗ be deﬁned by   B∗ = B∗ ∪  i  k    .
There is a unique simplex ¯ σ of     B∗  having σ as a facet. Increase the value
of both m and n by 1 and go to step 1 with xm+1 as the unique vertex of ¯ σ
opposite σ, B∗ =   B∗, and τn = σ.computation and selection of nash equilibria 105
Step 4. Let σ be equalto τn. Make a semi-lexicographic pivot step
with  0 e M 
 ¯ i−1
i=1 Mi + ¯ k   into the system of equations in Eq. (2) cor-
responding to AB∗ τn, where  ¯ i  ¯ k  is such that   B∗ ∪    ¯ i  ¯ k   = B∗. This
yields a unique column j  of AB∗ τn which has to be replaced. If j  ∈
 m + 1     M+ 1 − N , then decrease the value of both m and n by 1
and go to step 3 with  i  k    the pure strategy corresponding to column j 
and B∗ =   B∗. Otherwise, decrease the value of m by 1 and go to step 2 with
B∗ =   B∗.
The operation used in the proof of Lemma 4.3, where a column
of AB∗ τ is determined in a unique way and is replaced by the vector
 1    G xm+1  , corresponds to the semi-lexicographic pivot step made in
step 1 of Algorithm 4.5. Case 1 of Lemma 4.3 occurs if one goes from
step 1 of Algorithm 4.5 to step 2, and case 2 occurs if one goes from step 1
to step 3.
The operation used in the proof of Lemma 4.4, where a column
of AB∗ τ is determined in a unique way and is replaced by the vector
 0 e M 
 ¯ i−1
i=1 Mi + ¯ k    , corresponds to the semi-lexicographic pivot step
performed in step 4 of Algorithm 4.5. Case 1 of Lemma 4.4 happens if
one goes from step 4 of Algorithm 4.5 to step 3, and case 2 happens if one
goes from step 4 to step 2.
In Section 6 it is shown that the algorithm terminates after a ﬁnite num-
ber of steps, after having generated a B∗-complete facet τ that is a subset
of  1 ×S B∗ .
Consider all different pairs  B1
∗ τ1       B
ˆ k
∗ τ
ˆ k  successively generated
by Algorithm 4.5. For k = 1     ˆ k, τk = τk x1     x mk
 , with mk =  Bk
∗ +
1 − N. Deﬁne ˜ xk =  ˜ tk  ˜ sk ∈τk by ˜ xk =
 mk
j=1 ¯ λjxj, with ¯ λj following from
the admissible solution of the system in Eq. (2) corresponding to ABk
∗ τk.
So ˜ sk is an approximate Nash equilibrium of  
˜ tk
.F o rr ∈ , deﬁne  r 
as the greatest integer which is less than or equal to r. Finally, deﬁne the
piecewise linear continuous function π    0 1 →  0 1 ×S by
π r =  1 − ˆ k − 1 r +   ˆ k − 1 r  ˜ x1+  ˆ k−1 r 
+  ˆ k − 1 r −   ˆ k − 1 r  ˜ x2+  ˆ k−1 r  
For r = 1, the deﬁnition of π r  reads as π 1 =1·˜ x
ˆ k +0·˜ x
ˆ k+1.W ed on o t
formally deﬁne the point ˜ x
ˆ k+1, because the exact deﬁnition is immaterial.
Consider some r ∈  0 1 . Then π r =  t s  is a convex combination
of two points ˜ xk and ˜ xk+1. It is easily veriﬁed, because of the linearity
of the system, that π r  gives rise to an admissible solution for Eq. (2)
with B∗ equalto Bk
∗ ∩ Bk+1
∗ and σ equalto the convex hul lof τk and
τk+1.S os is an approximate Nash equilibrium of  t. The function π  
 0 1 →  0 1 ×S is called the path generated by the algorithm. When106herings and van den elzen
the mesh size of the triangulation used goes to 0, the path generated by
the algorithm converges to the linear tracing procedure. For a proof and a
precise statement, see Section 7.
5. AN EXAMPLE
To illustrate Algorithm 4.5, we consider the game of Figure 2. The
unique Nash equilibrium of this game is   2
3  1
3   3
4  1
4  . We write
 1 =    1 1   1 2  ,  2 =    2 1   2 2  , R1  1 1   2 1   = 2, etc.
Consider a prior p =    1
2  1
2   3
4  1
4  . It follows that
G11 t s =t 2s21 + s22 +  1 − t 7
4 
G12 t s =t s21 + 4s22 +  1 − t 7
4 
G21 t s =t 2s11 + 4s12 +  1 − t 3 
and
G22 t s =t 4s11 +  1 − t 2 
We take the triangulation   depicted in Figure 1.
First, we have to determine B0
∗. It is given by B0
∗ =    1 2   2 1  .
Against the prior, both pure strategies give player 1 a payoff of 7
4,
G11 0   1
2  1
2   3
4  1
4    = G12 0   1
2  1
2   3
4  1
4    = 7
4. The tie-breaking
rule introduced to determine B0
∗ requires that the second pure strategy of
player 1 be selected. It is obvious that s0 =    0 1   1 0   is a Nash equi-
librium of  0. The simplex τ1 is equalto  0  ×    0 1   1 0    and is
denoted in Figure 1 by ¯ x3. The unique simplex of     1 2   2 1    con-
taining τ1 as a facet is given by σ = co  ¯ x3  ¯ x12  , and the unique vertex
FIG. 2. A two-person game.computation and selection of nash equilibria 107
























































It is easily veriﬁed that  AB0
∗ τ1 −1 is semi-lexicopositive. The ﬁrst column
of  AB0
∗ τ1 −1, given by the vector  1 0 1  7
4 3 , corresponds to an admis-
sible solution of Eq. (2). Here λ1 = 1, the weight attached to vertex ¯ x3;
µ11 = 0 and µ22 = 1, the losses in payoff for player 1 using his ﬁrst strat-
egy and for player 2 using his second strategy; and β1 = 7
4 and β2 = 3,
the payoffs of players 1 and 2. Now we have to make a semi-lexicographic
pivot step with  1    G ¯ x12   =  1  15
8   11
8   7
2 1   into the system of equations
in Eq. (2) corresponding to AB0
∗ τ1. This yields column 2 to be replaced,
which corresponds to pure strategy  1 1 . Since 2 ∈  2 3 , we go to step 3
and increase the dimension of the simplices generated by 1.
Step 3 takes   B∗ = B∗ ∪    1 1   =    1 1   1 2   2 1  . The unique
simplex ¯ σ of     B∗  having co  ¯ x3  ¯ x12   as a facet is co  ¯ x2  ¯ x3  ¯ x12  .
Next, m and n are set equalto 2, and step 1 is carried out with x3 =¯ x2,
B∗ =    1 1   1 2   2 1  , τ2 = co  ¯ x3  ¯ x12  , etc. The algorithm reaches
 1 ×S after generating the 13 facets that are denoted by τ1     τ13 in
Figure 3.
It can be veriﬁed that τ1 = ¯ x3 , τ2 = co  ¯ x3  ¯ x12  , τ3 = co  ¯ x2  ¯ x12  ,
τ4 = co  ¯ x2  ¯ x11  , τ5 = co  ¯ x2  ¯ x10  , τ6 = co  ¯ x1  ¯ x10  , τ7 = co  ¯ x4,
¯ x10  , τ8 = co  ¯ x4  ¯ x10  ¯ x13  , τ9 = co  ¯ x10  ¯ x13  ¯ x14  , τ10 = co  ¯ x10  ¯ x14,
¯ x23  , τ11 = co  ¯ x10  ¯ x11  ¯ x23  , τ12 = co  ¯ x11  ¯ x19  ¯ x23  , and τ13 =
co  ¯ x19  ¯ x20  ¯ x23  . An interesting situation occurs at τ6.I ns t e p2w e
reach the case where τ6 belongs to the Cartesian product of  0 1  and the
boundary of S B∗ , τ6 ∈     1 1   2 1   . We have to go to step 4 to
decrease the dimension by 1. In step 4 we pivot in the vector  0 e 4 2  ,
since B∗ =   B∗ ∪    1 2  . This yields column 3 to be replaced, which cor-
responds to pure strategy 2 of player 2. Since 3 ∈  3 ,w eg ot os t e p3t o108 herings and van den elzen
FIG. 3. The algorithm in action.
increase the dimension. It holds that τ6 is both   1 1   1 2   2 1   com-
plete and   1 1   2 1   2 2   complete, yielding two different admissible
solutions to the system of equations in Eq. (2).
The importance of the semi-lexicographic pivot steps becomes clear when
reaching τ10. When ¯ x23 is pivoted in, ordinary pivot steps cannot determine
whether ¯ x13 or ¯ x14 should be pivoted out. We denote the facet obtained by
pivoting out ¯ x14 by ¯ τ10,s o¯ τ10 = co  ¯ x10  ¯ x13  ¯ x23  . In both cases, B∗ =  ∗.
It holds that
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It is easily veriﬁed that  A ∗  ¯ τ10 −1 is not semi-lexicopositive, since the third
row is not lexicographically positive. So ¯ τ10 will not be generated by the
semi-lexicographic pivot steps, but instead τ10 is the uniquely determined
facet. Since τ13 ⊂  1 ×S, the algorithm will terminate there, as is dictated
by step 2.
The path generated by the algorithm in the example is illustrated in






































































































































































































































































and all convex combinations of two successive points. The endpoint is
exactly equal to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game  .
Because the game of Figure 2 is so simple, it is possible to determine the
set  exactly. This set is depicted in Figure 3 by the dotted line. It is easily
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It is clear from the ﬁgure that even though the mesh size of the triangula-
tion is fairly large, the set  is approximated very well by Algorithm 4.5.
The point ﬁnally computed  ˜ x13 =  1   2
3  1
3   3
4  1
4   , yields the exact Nash
equilibrium s =    2
3  1
3   3
4  1
4  .
6. CONVERGENCE TO AN  -NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF  
We show that every step in Algorithm 4.5 is unique and feasible, and that
the algorithm generates a piecewise linear path in a sequence of adjacent
simplices. The path consists of approximate Nash equilibria of  t, t ∈  0 1 .
First, we show that ¯ τ =  0 ×S B0
∗  is B0
∗ complete and that there is no
other 0-simplex in the slice  0 ×S that is B∗ complete for some B∗.W e
consider the case  B∗ =N ﬁrst.
Lemma 6.1. Let    p    be given. The facet ¯ τ =  0 ×S B0
∗  is B0
∗ com-
plete. There is no other B∗-complete facet τ in  0 ×S with  B∗ =N.
Proof. Let t = 0 and  B∗ =N.I fτ ⊂  0 ×S is B∗ complete, then, for
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where Ei is the Mi × Mi unit matrix with column eMi ki  deleted. Inverting
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where   Ri ∈ 
Mi−1
+ is the column vector given by   Ril = Ri p\ i ki   −
Ri p\ i l  ,  i l ∈ i\  i ki  , and where   Ei is the  Mi − 1 ×Mi matrix
given by
  Ei =
 
eMi−1 1 ···eMi−1 ki − 1 −1Mi−1eMi−1 ki ···eMi−1 Mi − 1 
 
and eN×Mi i ki  is the  N × Mi  matrix ﬁlled with 0’s except in row i col-
umn ki, where a 1 occurs. If ki = 1, then the ﬁrst column of   Ei is given by
−1Mi−1, and if ki = Mi, then the last column of   Ei is given by −1Mi−1.B y
computing AB∗ τA
−1
B∗ τ, it is easily veriﬁed that A
−1
B∗ τ is indeed given by the
foregoing expression. Now A
−1
B∗ τ is semi-lexicopositive if and only if ki is
the largest integer such that  i ki  is a best reply to p for player i.
The next lemma shows that there are no B∗-complete facets τ in  0 ×S
where the cardinality of B∗ exceeds N.
Lemma 6.2. Let    p    be given. Then there is no B∗-complete facet τ
in  0 ×S with  B∗  >N.
Proof. Consider any  B∗  >Nand any facet τ  0 s1       0 sm   ⊂








1 ··· 10 ··· ··· ··· ··· 0
E1 0 −1M1 0
  G 0 s1  ···   G 0 sm  0
    00
    0








Observe that   Gik 0 sj =Ri p\ i k  ,  i k ∈ i.S o  G 0 sj  is inde-
pendent of j and AB∗ τ is not invertible. Therefore, τ is certainly not B∗
complete.112 herings and van den elzen
Lemma 6.1 selects for each player a unique pure strategy such that the
resulting pure strategy combination, denoted by s0, is a Nash equilibrium
for the game  0. Lemma 6.2 shows that there are no other Nash equilibria
for the game  0 that satisfy our criterion of completeness. The resulting
point  0 s0  is linked in step 0 of Algorithm 4.5 to a point  t s1  that is the
other vertex of the unique simplex in   B0
∗  having  0 ×S B0
∗  as a facet.
It has already been indicated that Algorithm 4.5 generates a sequence of
adjacent complete facets with varying dimension. The idea of adjacent is
made precise in Deﬁnition 6.3.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Adjacent Complete Facets). Let    p    be given.
The complete facets ¯ τ and ˆ τ are adjacent if ¯ τ and ˆ τ are both B∗-complete
facets of the same simplex of   B∗ ,i f¯ τ is a   B∗-complete facet of the
  B∗-complete simplex ˆ τ of     B∗ ,o ri fˆ τ is a   B∗-complete facet of the
  B∗-complete simplex ¯ τ of     B∗ .
Theorem 6.4. Let    p    be given. Consider a B∗-complete facet τ.I f
τ =  0 ×S B0
∗  or τ ⊂  1 ×S, then τ has one adjacent complete facet.
Otherwise, τ has two adjacent complete facets.
Proof. Let τ =  0 ×S B0
∗ . Since  0 ×S B0
∗  is a subset of the relative
boundary of  0 1 ×S B0
∗ , there is a unique 1-simplex σ ∈   B0
∗  such that
τ is a facet of σ. By Lemma 4.3, it holds that either σ has exactly one other
B0
∗-complete facet ¯ τ or the 1-simplex σ is   B∗-complete for precisely one
admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗. So there exists exactly one adjacent complete facet to
 0 ×S B0
∗ .
Let τ ⊂  1 ×S be B∗ complete. Clearly, there is no admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗
such that τ ∈     B∗ , since a simplex in     B∗  always has vertices outside
 1 ×S. Since τ is a subset of the relative boundary of  0 1 ×S, there is
a unique 1-simplex σ ∈   B∗  such that τ is a facet of σ. It follows again
by Lemma 4.3 that there is exactly one adjacent complete facet to τ.
For all other adjacent complete facets τ, it holds that τ belongs either to
the relative boundary of  0 1 ×S or to the relative interior of  0 1 ×S.
In the ﬁrst case, there is a unique σ ∈   B∗  having τ as a facet. By
Lemma 4.3, it holds that either σ has exactly one other B∗-complete facet
¯ τ or that σ is   B∗ complete for precisely one admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗. This gives
us one adjacent complete facet to τ. Moreover, τ ∈       B∗  for precisely
one admissible     B∗ ⊂  ∗, since τ lies in the relative boundary of   B∗ ,
τ  =  0 ×S B0
∗  by assumption, τ is not a subset of  1 ×S by assump-
tion, and τ/ ∈  0 ×S by Lemma 6.2. By Lemma 4.4, it holds that either τ
is   B∗ complete for precisely one admissible   B∗ ⊂  ∗ with   B∗  = B∗ or pre-
cisely one facet υ of τ is     B∗ complete. In the latter case, we are done. In
the former case, since τ belongs to the relative boundary of     B∗ , there is
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gives the second adjacent complete facet to τ. There can be no other adja-
cent complete facets to τ.
When τ belongs to the relative interior of   B∗ , we apply Lemma 4.3
twice to get exactly two adjacent complete facets.
The implications of Theorem 6.4 are striking. The B0
∗-complete facet
 0 ×S B0
∗  has exactly one adjacent complete facet. That facet either
belongs to the boundary of  1 ×S, and we have found an approximate
Nash equilibrium, or has exactly one adjacent complete facet not equal to
 0 ×S B0
∗ . In this way, a sequence of adjacent complete facets is gen-
erated in a unique way, starting from  0 ×S B0
∗ . The systematic steps
of how to generate this sequence are given in Algorithm 4.5. Theorem 6.5
shows that the algorithm always reaches a complete facet in  1 ×S in
a ﬁnite number of steps. As stated in Theorem 6.6, this implies that the
algorithm converges to an  -Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite number of steps.
It will usually not be the case that the boundary  1 ×S is reached in one
step. For this to occur, the triangulation   must have a very large mesh
size.
Theorem 6.5 (Convergence of Algorithm 4.5). Let    p    be given.
Then there exists a unique ﬁnite sequence of complete facets τ1     τ
ˆ k such
that τ1 =  0 ×S B0
∗ , τ
ˆ k ⊂  1 ×S, and any two successive facets in the
ﬁnite sequence are adjacent complete facets.
Proof. Let τ1 =  0 ×S B0
∗ .L e tτ2 be the unique adjacent complete
facet that exists according to Theorem 6.4. Whenever τk for some k>1
is not equalto  0 ×S B0
∗  and is not a subset of  1 ×S, there exists
by Theorem 6.4 a unique adjacent complete facet τk+1 not equalto τk−1.
Now it follows from the door-in door-out principle of Lemke and Howson
(1964) that all simplices generated in the foregoing sequence are different.
Moreover, the collection of all facets of simplices in   B∗  is ﬁnite for any
admissible B∗ ⊂  ∗. So, after a ﬁnite number of steps, say ˆ k, a facet in
 1 ×S must be reached.
By connecting the solutions found in each of the complete facets gen-
erated by the algorithm, we ﬁnd the path generated by the algorithm,
π    0 1 →  0 1 ×S, as constructed in Section 4.
Theorem 6.6. Let  >0 be given. Choose δ such that  ˆ x −˜ x ∞ ≤ δ
implies  G ˆ x −G ˜ x  ∞ ≤ 1
2 , ˆ x  ˜ x ∈  0 1 ×S. Let    p    be such that
mesh   ≤δ. Then π r =  t s  implies that s is an  -Nash equilibrium of  t.
Moreover, π 0 =  0 s  with siki = 1 for all  i ki ∈B0
∗, and π 1 =  1 s∗ 
with s∗ an  -Nash equilibrium of  .
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from Theorem 3.2, Theorem 6.5,
and the deﬁnition of Algorithm 4.5.114 herings and van den elzen
Theorem 6.6 shows that any  t s  in the image set of π corresponds to an
 -Nash equilibrium of  t. Since we have shown that the algorithm reaches
a complete facet in  1 ×S in a ﬁnite number of steps, we know that the
algorithm converges to an  -Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Notice that this result is true for any game and any prior, irrespective of
possible degeneracies. It is clear that the inaccuracy of the ﬁnal solution
generated,  , depends on the mesh size of the triangulation. If the mesh
size of the triangulation δ goes to 0, then the inaccuracy   can be chosen
such as to go to 0, since G is a continuous function deﬁned on a compact
set. From a practicalperspective, there is a cl ear trade-off between rapid
convergence and very accurate solutions.
7. CONVERGENCE TO THE LINEAR TRACING PROCEDURE
It has been shown that Algorithm 4.5 converges to some  -Nash equilib-
rium, given any game and prior. It remains to be shown that this  -Nash
equilibrium is indeed an approximation of the Nash equilibrium selected by
the linear tracing procedure. To verify this, we need a distance function to
measure the discrepancy between the set c generated by the linear tracing
procedure and points π r  which are generated by Algorithm 4.5.
Let  denote the collection of all nonempty compact subsets of  0 1 ×S.
We deﬁne the distance function d    0 1 ×S ×  →  by
d x  T =min
y∈T
 x − y ∞ x ∈  0 1 ×S  T ∈  
Theorem 7.1. Let    p  be given. Then for every  >0, there exists δ>0
such that for every triangulation   of  0 1 ×S satisfying mesh    <δ , it holds
that maxr∈ 0 1  d π r  c ≤ .
Proof. Suppose that the theorem is not true. Then there exists  >0
such that for every n ∈ , there exists a triangulation  n of  0 1 ×S such
that mesh  n  < 1
n, and there exists rn ∈  0 1  such that d πn rn  c  >  .
Here πn    0 1 →  0 1 ×S denotes the path generated by the algorithm
when the triangulation  n is used. By Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 1,
p. 16), the sequence  πn  0 1   n∈ has a convergent subsequence. By
Theorem 3.2 and by continuity of the function G, it follows that the closed
limit of a converging subsequence of  πn  0 1   n∈ belongs to . More-
over, since πn  0 1   is connected for every n ∈ , the closed limit is con-
nected by Mas-Colell (1985, Theorem A.5.1(ii), p. 10). But then the closed
limit should be a subset of c, since it contains points in 0. Take any
accumulation point ¯ x of the sequence  πn rn  n∈. Then
0 = d ¯ x c ≥inf d πn rn  c  n ∈  ≥  
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Theorem 7.1 shows that for all games, the algorithm stays arbitrarily close
to the strategies deﬁned by the linear tracing procedure. This holds true
even if the linear tracing procedure is not well deﬁned and does not select
a unique Nash equilibrium. In that case, the  -Nash equilibrium generated
by the algorithm is still an approximation of one of the Nash equilibria in
c. Theorem 7.1 not only claims that π 1  is close to a Nash equilibrium
selected by the linear tracing procedure, but also makes clear that the entire
path π does not get further than   away from c.
Theorem 7.2. Let    p  be given. If the linear tracing procedure is well
deﬁned, then for every  >0 there exists δ>0 such that for every triangula-
tion   of  0 1 ×S satisfying mesh    <δ , it holds that max t s ∈c d  t s ,
π  0 1    ≤  . Moreover, if  0 s0 ∈c, then d  0 s0 ,  π 0    ≤  , and if
 1 s∗ ∈c, then d  1 s∗   π 1    ≤  .
Proof. Suppose that the theorem is not true. Then there exists  >0
such that for every n ∈  there is a triangulation  n of  0 1 ×S with
mesh  n  < 1
n and there is  tn sn ∈c such that d  tn sn  πn  0 1    >
 . Without loss of generality, the sequence   tn sn  n∈ is convergent, say
to  ¯ t ¯ s , and by Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 1, p. 16), the sequence
  πn  0 1    n∈ is convergent, say to the set  . By Theorem 7.1, it follows
that   ⊂ c. Obviously,  ¯ t ¯ s  / ∈  . Since the set 0 is a polytope, well
deﬁnedness of the linear tracing procedure implies that 0 contains a single
point, say  0 s0 . Similarly, well deﬁnedness yields that there is only one
 t s ∈c such that t = 1, say  1 s1 . It follows that πn 0 →  0 s0 
and πn 1 →  1 s1 . The results of Schanuel et al. (1991) imply that c
is path connected. Then it is easily seen that the linear tracing procedure
is well deﬁned if and only if there is a homeomorphism h    0 1 →c
with h 0 =  0 s0  and h 1 =  1 s1 . Moreover, there is ¯ r ∈  0 1  such
that  ¯ t ¯ s =h ¯ r . By Mas-Colell (1985, Theorem A.5.1.(ii), p. 10),   is
connected. However,   ⊂ h  0 1 \ ¯ r  , h 0 ∈ , h 1 ∈ , and h is a
homeomorphism, and so   is not connected, a contradiction.
Theorem 7.2 claims that the path generated by the algorithm approx-
imates every strategy of the linear tracing procedure if the linear tracing
procedure is well deﬁned. Obviously, if, for instance, the set c has a branch
point, then it cannot be expected that all points in c are approximated by
the path π generated by Algorithm 4.5. In this case the algorithm will track
one of the branches that leads to an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 7.3. Let    p  be given. Let   n n∈ be a sequence of tri-
angulations of  0 1 ×S with mesh size converging to 0. If the linear tracing
procedure is well deﬁned, then πn  0 1   converges to c in the Hausdorff
topology on .116herings and van den elzen
If the linear tracing procedure is well deﬁned, then every strategy gener-
ated by it is approximated by Algorithm 4.5, (see Theorem 7.2), and every
strategy generated by Algorithm 4.5 approximates a strategy corresponding
to the linear tracing procedure according to Theorem 7.1. Since the lin-
ear tracing procedure is well deﬁned for almost every game (see Harsanyi,
1975), this implies that the algorithm converges to the linear tracing proce-
dure in the Hausdorff sense for almost all games.
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